INTRODUCTION
Consider a decision problem of the form I$:x 77(a) = EyJ(X t LYY), (1.1) where X is a random variable representing a decision maker's current prospect, Y is a random variable representing a possible venture, and y is his utility function for future wealth. The current prospect reflects the decision maker's possible values of future wealth if he proceeds with his present plans, commitments, business undertakings, investments, etc. The venture Y is a prospective security purchase or sale, business deal, insurance policy, or other project that, if undertaken, may influence future wealth. If LY is the amount of the venture undertaken, X + LXY becomes the decision maker's new pr0spect.l A represents possible emounts of the venture.
A is determined by the circumstances of the particular venture under consideration. A purchase of common stock could be any nonnegative integral number of shares up to the limit of the decision maker's resources. Stock options or commodity futures could be bought or sold so a could be HILDRETH AND TESFATSION positive or negative. Joining a partnership might require a specified investment so A would consist of two points: 0 and the specified investment. It is convenient to initially assume that 01 might be any real number and subsequently consider restrictions that might be imposed in particular applications (see [2, p. lo] ). Unless otherwise noted, A is assumed equal to R, the real line.
If 9: is differentiable and concave (risk aversion) and if E 1 rp(X -sctY)i , E : ?'~~'(A -+-aY)i are finite then 7 is differentiable [3, p. 31 and
7. strictly concave implies 7 strictly concave in which case the optimal (maximizing) value of ac, say 8, is unique if it exists. B exists if lim,,, v'(x) = 0 and P( Y -.. 0) > 0 and P( Y < 0) > 0 (neither Y nor -Y is a sure thing) P, P. 101.
One is interested in relating B to properties of the initial prospect and the venture that may sometimes be determinable in practical situations. With strict concavity, hereinafter assumed, & uniquely solves q'(o1) = 0. q(o1) has the form of an inverted U, so one way to investigate the general location of d is to try to determine the sign of 
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR POSITIVE COVARIANCE
Under risk aversion, q~' is decreasing so Condition (i) below makes Cov (Y, v'(X)) positive. Each of the other conditions is shown to imply Condition (i) and relations among the other conditions are explored. As is customary if F, G are probability distribution functions, F < G is defined to mean F(x) .< G(x) Vx E R and F f G. (iii) * (ii). Choose a version of E( Y 1 X = x) that is strictly decreasing. Let f = sup(x : E(Y / X = x) > EY).
(iv) * (ii). The following lemma is proved in [7] and modifies an earlier lemma by Hanoch and Levy.
LEMMA.
If F, G are distribution functions and 0 : R + R is continuous, nondecreasing, and s BdF < co, s 8dG < 00, then jddF -jBdG = j(G -F) dt?. 
Whether other implications might exist is a natural question answered by (ii) implies only (i).
Since (iv) * (ii) and (iv) + (viii), (vii), (vi), (v), or (iii); (ii) does not imply any of the latter. Since (iii) =>-(ii) and (iii) % (iv); (ii) + (iv).
(i) implies none of the others.
Since (vii) 2 (i) but (vii) + (ii), (i) P (ii). Since each of the others implies (ii), (i) could not imply any without implying (ii).
Quite a few propositions closely related to those of Theorem 1 may be obtained by reversing or weakening appropriate inequalities and monotonicities in both assumptions and conclusions. For example, (ii') 3 (i') and (iii*) m:-(i*) where
(i') Y is negatively correlated with any strictly decreasing function of X that has finite second moment.
(iii*) E( Y j X = x) is a nonincreasing function of x.
(i*) Y is not negatively correlated with any nonincreasing function of X with finite second moment.
Other possible modifications seem reasonably clear and too numerous to try to list.
APPLICATION
Condition (vii), called negative S-correlation by Scheffman, has been found useful by Samuelson [5] and Scheffman [6] in establishing several theorems on diversification of investlents. Some illustrative applications of other conditions follow. The general assumptions of Section 1 (e.g., the strict concavity of the utility function v) will be assumed to hold throughout.
Insurance
A decision maker stands to lose an amount w > 0 if the event A occurs. In exchange for a premium c, he is offered an insurance policy that will cover this contingent loss. Viewed as a venture the policy can be written Y = WI, ~-c where Z,, is the indicator function of the event A. Suppose he can also elect partial coverage at a proportionally reduced premium, i.e., he can elect to pay a premium oic, 0 < 01 < I, and be reimbursed 01w if the loss occurs.
Let Z represent his current prospect other than this possibility of loss. His expacted utility as a function of the chosen coverage 01 is then T/(m) = Erp(Z -WZA + ci(wI, -c)) = Ey(X + u Y) (3.1)
with X = Z -wf, , Y = WI, -c. Assuming Z is independent of A, Condition (vii) of Section 2 is satisfied. To observe the circumstances under which some coverage will be taken, note
Since (Theorem 1) (vii) 3 (i), we know that the covariance is positive. Examining the first term on the right, EYE@(X) = (WP, -c) E&(X), (3.3) one observes that ET' is always positive and (WP, -c) is the subjective actuarial value2 of the policy. From (3.2) (3.3), and (1.3),
Since the ratio on the right is known to be negative, it is clear that some coverage will be chosen if the subjective actuarial value is nonnegative or even somewhat negative, so long as c < ,{,p
Calculation of this upper limit on the premium would, of course, require detailed knowledge of decision maker's utility and subjective probability. One may also be interested in the circumstances under which full coverage will be taken. By (3.6) the final equality following from the independence of 2 and A. Thus aig lowP,-cco.
13.7)
Thus full coverage will be desired if the policy is offered at exactly subjective actuarial value and less (more) than full coverage if the policy offers less (more) than subjective actuarial value.
The results readily extend to more general kinds of coverage. Let W be any pattern of potential loss and let c be a premium covering such a loss. Then X = 2 -W, Y = W -c. Condition (vii) is still satisfied (assuming 2, W independent) and 02$oO((EW-c)g -Cov( w, qwf>> E$(X) '
e The subjective actuarial value could be. different for the decision maker and the insurance company if they have different estimates of PA , or if an uninsured property loss by the decision maker would involve secondary losses-loss of customers, borrowing on unfavorable terms, etc. In the latter case, the actual claim would be less than W.
where EW -c is the subjective actuarial value and Cov( W, q'(X)) is known to be positive.
A Professional GO&I
A successful golfer has decided to allow his name to appear on a related product. He can take as remuneration a percentage of sales, a specified annual fee, or an appropriate mixture of the two.
Let S be a random variable representing prospective sales and let h be the percentage he receives if he takes no specified fee. Let h be the fee he receives if he takes no percentage of sales, and assume he can also elect to receive &S-~-(1 -a)hforO.<cu<l.
Let R be his prospective earnings from other sources. The relation of his expected utility to his choice of fraction 01 is given by T(") == Eq(R j-ahS + ( 1 -a) /I) = Ey,(R + h + a(hs -/I)), (3.9) whichhastheformof(l.l)withX=R+h, Y=(hS-h),O<ol< 1. Since outcomes of tournaments may be expected to dominate R and strongly influence S, it seems natural that E(S / R = r) and therefore E( Y / X = x) is a strictly increasing function.3 This is the opposite of Condition (iii) and implies that Y is negatively correlated with any decreasing function of X.
To investigate sign 12, write
Thus, a risk averse expected utility maximizing golfer would take the flat fee unless his expectation of return from sales is sufficiently higher than h. Again, "sufficiently" can be made precise only with additional knowledge of utility and subjective probability in a particular case. Clearly, a still higher margin would be required for him to choose only income from sales.
Business or Securities
The owner-operator of a manufacturing plant has current prospect R and resources to invest equal to h. He has a chance to become a partner in operating a similar plant in another state. Any resources not used in the partnership will be invested in a fixed-yield riskless security.
Assume R = r( W, Z) where W is an index of conditions in the industry in which the decision maker is engaged and Z represents local circumstances influencing profitability of his plant. r is a strictly increasing function of W. Let S = s(W, V) represent prospective returns from the new plant where V represents relevant circumstances in the new location4 and s is strictly increasing in its first argument. Then expected utility is where b is return on the riskless security and 01 is the amount invested in the partnership. In the notation of (1.1), X = R + hb, Y = S -b.
If Z and V are independent a condition opposite to (vii) holds and Y is negatively correlated with any decreasing function of X. Except for the reasoning that leads to the conclusion of negative correlation, the example is like the golfer example. Tn the present case (3.12) with the covariance known to be negative.
Clearly the conditions studied here do not answer many of the questions investigators must pose, but we hope the illustrations suggest that noting such a condition may sometimes get an analysis started in a useful direction.
